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Although the civil service plays a critical role in economic development, it 
performs poorly in many countries, partly due to civil servants’ low salaries. 
Therefore, in 2015, the Bangladesh government doubled the salary of civil 
servants. However, the reform may worsen public service delivery by attracting 
those who have lower public service motivation (PSM). Using the data of 
applicants to the Bangladesh civil service (BCS), this study examines the effect 
of the 2015 pay-scale reform on PSM. Taking a difference-in-differences 
approach, this study finds that the BCS officers hired after the reform are both 
academically smarter and more motivated to public service than those hired 
before the reform. Our results suggest that salary increases can be an effective 
for recruiting higher-quality officers.  
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1. Introduction 
A competent civil service, as a core element of state capacity, is essential for the efficient 
provision of public services and key to reducing poverty in developing countries 
(Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016). However, the civil service in many developing countries 
is characterized by low productivity (Nunberg & Nellis, 1990; Shepherd, 2003). It is widely 
recognized that lower compensation in the public sector is one of the main reasons for this 
low productivity (Delfgaauw & Dur, 2010; Finan, Olken, & Pande, 2017). Therefore, offering 
greater financial incentives can be an effective policy instrument to motivate those who were 
already hired and/or to recruit higher-quality candidates for public sector jobs (De Ree, 
Muralidharan, Pradhan, & Rogers, 2018). Unlike private-sector jobs, however, it is often the 
case that the performance of civil servants is difficult to measure objectively.1 This is why 
public sector does not normally adopt performance-based payment and instead tries to recruit 
people who are willing to work hard without financial incentives (Prendergast, 2007).  
This desire to work unselfishly in the public sector is known as Public Service 
Motivation (PSM) (Perry, 1996). It is found that those with high PSM strongly aspire to join 
the public sector to serve the community (Delfgaauw & Dur, 2008; Francois, 2000). PSM is, 
therefore, an important predictor for productivity and service delivery in the public sector 
(Perry & Vandenabeele, 2015). However, whether higher wages attract workers with lower 
PSM to civil service depends on the correlation between PSM and productivity (Barigozzi, 
Burani, & Raggi, 2018). If these are positively (negatively) correlated, financial incentives 
attract (screen out) individuals with not only high quality but also high PSM. Therefore, it is 
possible that offering a higher wage can screen out those with high PSM from civil service 
                                                  
1Empirical studies examining the effect of financial incentive on performance in public sector jobs are 
limited to frontline service providers such as school teachers (de Ree et al. 2018; Duflo et al. 
2012) and community health providers (Ashraf et al. 2016; Banerjee et al. 2008).  
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jobs.  
The existing empirical literature examining the effect of financial incentive on 
recruitment shows mixed results and is limited to the case community agents, not higher-level 
officers. With respect to positive effects, Dal Bo, Finan, & Rossi (2013) find that higher 
wages attract individuals with higher pro-social motivation for community development 
agent positions in marginalized municipalities in Mexico.2 For negative effects, Deserrano 
(2019) finds that higher financial incentives attract more applicants but crowd out the most 
socially motivated people from community health promoter positions in Uganda. Based on a 
lab-in-the-field experiment with college students in Indonesia, Banuri and Keefer (2016) find 
that once a higher salary is offered, students with lower PSM are more likely to choose to join 
the public sector.3 Thus, in the recruitment for civil service positions with high promotion 
prospects, there have been no rigorous empirical studies thus far that examine whether higher 
financial incentives screen out those with higher PSM.  
This study examines the role of financial incentives in recruiting Bangladesh civil 
service (BCS) officers. BCS plays a key role in preparing policy and executing, supervising, 
and monitoring the tasks of the government (Zafarullah, 2003). However, the performance of 
BCS has not been satisfactory. According to World Bank governance indicators, the 
efficiency of BCS is low and declining (Khan, 2015). This is believed to be because the 
quality of the civil servants is not high, particularly due to a low salary (Jahan & Sahan, 
2012). In July 2015, the Bangladesh government doubled the civil service pay scales 
                                                  
2 In a closely related study, Ashraf, Bandiera, and Lee (2018) find that, in the recruitment of 
community health workers in Zambia, career incentives to ascend the civil-service career ladder 
to better-paid positions help the public sector to attract candidates with higher PSM. 
3 Using a lab experiment on Indian college students, Hanna and Wang (2017) find that those who 
cheat on a dice task and those with lower pro-social preferences are more likely to prefer 
entering government service after graduation, regardless of cognitive ability. 
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(Rhaman & Al-Hasan, 2018),4 after which the number of applicants increased dramatically 
(Hossain, 2019a; Islam, 2019). 
This paper contributes to the literature by answering the question if the financial 
incentive attracts people with higher educational achievement but lower PSM to the public 
sector. Using the reform as a natural experiment, this study estimates the impact of the higher 
wage on the qualifications and the motivational profiles of BCS applicants and incumbent 
officers. It is based on the data collected by face-to-face interviews with applicants who took 
the BCS examination before the reform and those who took it after. The estimation results 
show that BCS officers who were hired after the reform are better, both in academic records 
and PSM, than those before the reform.  
This study contributes to the broader literature on labor economics and on public 
sector personnel economics, which investigates the effect of higher wages on recruitment 
(Dal Bo et al., 2013; Deserranno, 2019; Ashraf et al., 2018). To the best of the authors’ 
knowledge, no other study has investigated the effect of a national-level pay-scale increase on 
the applicant pool of the civil service in developing countries. This study provides new 
evidence regarding the effect of the national-level compensation policy on the type of civil 
service applicants.5 
                                                  
4 Just before the pay-scale reform, the average monthly wage was 17,969 BDT ($ 225) in the private 
sector and 22,040 BDT ($ 276) in the public sector. The wage differential between public and 
private wage increased from 10.6 percent in 2013 to 22.7 percent in 2015 (Rahman and 
Al-Hasan, 2018). 
5 There are empirical studies examining the performance of civil service officers in developing 
countries. Bertrand et al. (2018) find that the Indian Administrative service (IAS) officers 
entering the civil service at a later age have lower promotion prospects, which results in lower 
performance as measured by stakeholders’ evaluation and suspension records. Rasul and Rogger 
(2018), examining the Nigerian civil service, show that offices’ use of more management 
practices on performance incentives is negatively correlated with the performance measure of 
the development projects’ completion rate.  
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Following this introduction, this paper presents the institutional background of BCS 
and the pay scale reforms in the next section. The section that follows explains the conceptual 
framework and postulate hypotheses. The data and characteristics of the sample are presented 
in the next section, and the empirical methods and estimation results are discussed thereafter. 
The final section presents the summary and conclusions.  
2. Institutional Background of Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS) and Pay Scale 
Reforms 
BCS is vertically divided into four classes (Class I to IV). Class-I officers conduct managerial 
and professional activities and are further divided into two categories: BCS cadre officers and 
Non-BCS gazette officers. In general, promotion prospects are higher for BCS cadre officers 
than for non-BCS gazette officers (Khan, 2015; Ferdous, 2015). BCS is vertically divided 
into 28 service cadres. The 28 cadres are divided into two main categories: managerial 
(general) cadres and technical cadres (Islam, 2016; Khan, 2015; Kim & Monem, 2009). Civil 
service officers’ status and ranking are set by the grades (20 is the lowest and 1 is the 
highest).  
The recruitment of civil service officers is managed and administered by the 
Bangladesh Public Service Commission (BPSC), an independent constitutional body. All 
ministries apprise BPSC of their vacant posts through the Ministry of Public Administration. 
The civil service examination consists of (1) preliminary examination, (2) the written 
examination, and (3) the viva voce examination6  (Jahan, 2012 & Ministry of Public 
                                                  
6 BPSC members chair the viva board, which consists of a psychologist from a recognized university 
and higher government officials from a ministry nominated by the Ministry of Public 
Administration (Khan, 2015). The viva board members assess the candidates based on their 
intellectuality, emotional stability, smartness, leadership attributes, and involvement in other 
activities, such as sports, debate competitions, and hobbies. In 2013, the number of applicants 
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Administration, 2014). Until 2018, 56% of the positions were allocated according to quota 
provisions for privileged groups such as freedom fighters’ descendants, women, people from 
backward districts and indigenous communities, and physically challenged individuals (Khan, 
2015).  
After the independence of Bangladesh, the government made several attempts to 
increase the civil servant pay-scales to align the salary with the cost of living. However, since 
the inflation rate was higher than the pay increases, the benefit from the increased pay eroded 
within a few months (Islam, 2016; Khan, 2015). In July 2015, the government reformed the 
civil servant pay structures, which was the first time this was done based on inflation and 
living costs. Previously, most applicants came from the arts and humanities, whereas after the 
2015 pay scale reform, students from other departments, especially engineering, have begun 
to apply for civil service jobs (Azad, 2018; Mujumdar, 2017).  
3. Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses 
The research question of this paper is if the financial incentive attracts people with higher 
educational achievement but lower PSM to the public sector. Roy’s (1951) model shows that 
candidates select a job if his/her expected return from the job is higher than the reservation 
wage. The expected return depends on the skills needed for a particular job and expected 
wage from the job. The expected returns include utility gains and satisfaction from the job. 
Therefore, even for the same job, the expected returns can differ based on the preference of 
job characteristics. Those who have higher PSM are expected to have higher satisfaction from 
public rather than the private sector jobs in a given wage. When the public sector wage was 
lower than that in private sector, those with high PSM and low reservation wage tend to apply 
                                                                                                                                                           
for the BCS exam was 221,575, of which 9,515 passed the written exam and 2,175 were selected 
for appointment. In 2015, 244,107 people applied for the BCS exam; 6,088 of them passed the 
written exam and 2,158 were selected for appointment (BPSC, 2015).  
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for the public sector jobs.  
Since the 2015 reform drastically increased salaries in the public sector compared 
with the private sector, it can equally attract people with high PSM and high reservation wage 
and those with low PSM and high reservation wage. As long as the number of 
higher-qualified candidates with high PSM increases and the selection committee can detect 
candidates with low PSM, the quality of civil service officers is expected to improve after the 
reform without sacrificing PSM.    
4. Data and Empirical method 
4.1 Data and sample 
From 2012 to 2015, the BPSC invited applications for the 33rd, 34th, and 35th BCS 
examinations (advertised in February 2012, February 2013, and September, 2014, 
respectively). The news about the pay scale reform that the government for civil servants had 
already been released before the advertisement of the 35th BCS examination,7 and thus, its 
applicants are considered as the post-reform cohort. Those who took the 33rd and 34th BCS 
examinations were pre-reform cohorts.  
Data from both BCS personnel and the applicants who did not pass the BCS 
examination were collected by the authors. The survey was conducted from October 15 to 
December 20, 2017. As the information on the applicants for civil service examination is 
confidential, it was not possible to acquire a complete list of applicants. Therefore, to prepare 
a nationally representative sample, data were collected from three groups: (1) 303 
junior-level BCS (administration cadre) officers who applied for the BCS examinations in 
                                                  
7 The news of the 2015 pay scale reform was published in August 2014 (Daily Nation, 2014). There 
was an analysis of the pay scales by the leading think tank of Bangladesh on September 8, 2014 
(Centre for Policy Dialogue, 2015). 
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2012, 2013, and 2015; this sample size is the 40% of the total BCS (Administration cadre) 
officers8 (2) 108 applicants who attended a coaching center and applied for the BCS 
examinations held in 2012, 2013, and/or 2015, but did not pass; and, (3) 22 friends of group 
(1) above, who took the BCS examination in 2012, 2013, and/or 2015 but did not pass.  
For the results to be nationally representative, data were collected from 32 districts 
covering all eight divisions of Bangladesh.9 Based on the number of officers in the district 
office, 8 to 15 BCS officers from each office were randomly sampled, to obtain a total of 303. 
Of these, the number of officers who took the examination in 2012, 2013, and 2015 was 90, 
98, and 115, respectively. Interviewers were properly trained to explain the purpose of the 
study and the confidentiality of responses to the participants, so that they would be willing to 
provide honest answers to the questions. The interviews were conducted individually and 
separately. 
The list of applicants who took the examination in 2012, 2013, and 2015 was 
collected from an established coaching center10 in Dhaka. From the list, 108 individuals were 
randomly selected. The interviews normally took place at the respondent’s home or office, as 
requested by the respondent. The BCS officers in the sample were first interviewed and the 
list of their friends’ names and cellphone numbers was collected by asking whether they have 
                                                  
8 In the BCS (Administration cadre), the number of officers recruited are 290, 279, and 280 in 2012, 
2013, and 2015, respectively (BPSC, 2015). Only BCS (administration cadre) officers are 
selected as our sample. This is because there are few officers recruited for other cadre services in 
2012, 2013, and 2015. 
9 Based on the number of districts within the division, 2 to 5 district offices from each division were 
randomly selected. 
10 In Bangladesh, there are a few coaching centers that offer intensive programs for the preparation of 
BCS exam. Generally, after graduation, a good number of applicants take the BCS examination 
after preparation via a coaching center. The coaching centers are few, and mostly located in 
Dhaka. Anyone can enroll in the coaching centers by paying around $125. The course duration is 
1-6 months (most commonly 3 months) for preliminary, written, and viva voce examinations.  
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friends who applied for the BCS examination in the same year but did not pass. Thereafter, 22 
individuals were selected from the list.  
4.2 Measures of qualities 
To measure the raw qualities of the civil service applicants, both their cognitive and 
non-cognitive abilities were assessed. The cognitive abilities were measured by the highest 
grade (A+) on their Secondary School Certificate (SSC) examination and whether he/she is a 
graduate from an engineering university/department. The SSC examination is a centralized 
public examination held after 10 years of schooling (NUFFIC, 2012). In Bangladesh, those 
who apply to engineering university need to receive at least 90% marks both in the secondary 
and higher secondary public exams. Whether one studies in the engineering department is a 
good proxy of a good academic record.  The monthly real gross income in the previous job is 
also used as a measure of work-related skills as a high grade in school does not guarantee that 
one has higher productivity in the workplace. As a measure of non-cognitive ability, the 
Big-Five Personality Traits are used to capture different dimensions of the sampled 
individuals’ personalities, which are necessary to perform effectively in the workplace.  
Public Service Motivation (PSM) is considered to be an important characteristic for 
public-sector workers to provide public services effectively (Perry & Wise, 2005; Francois, 
2000; Kwon, 2012; Naff & Crum, 1999). PSM is measured through Perry’s (1996) PSM 
scale. Since PSM is closely related to pro-social behavior and social preferences, the 
pro-social behavior and the social preferences of the applicants are used in the analyses. For 
measuring pro-social behavior, the applicants are asked whether they participated in either 
volunteer or charity activities before applying for the civil service examination. By using 
non-incentivized hypothetical questions, social preference measures such as patience, 
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risk-aversion, and altruism are elicited.11 
4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
This section presents the average characteristics of the civil service applicants and incumbent 
civil service officers who applied for the BCS examination before and after the pay scale 
reform (pre- and post-reform cohorts). Panel A consists of socio-demographic and parental 
characteristics while Panel B shows educational background. Panel C indicates variables 
related with personality traits. The first two columns of Table 1 show the average 
characteristics of applicants who took the exam before and after the reform. The third column 
shows the results of the t-test (p-value) if the mean characteristics are statistically different 
between these two groups. The fourth and fifth columns indicate the mean characteristics of 
BCS officers who took the exam before and after the reform, respectively. The last column 
indicates whether the means of these two groups are different. 
The first three columns of Table 1 show that applicants who took the exam after the 
reform are less likely to be married, to have quota privilege, and to have experience in 
working in the private sector, and are more likely to have a father who owns a business, to 
obtain the highest grade in the SSC exam, and to have attended school in an urban area than 
applicants who took exam before the reform. According to the last three columns, BCS 
officers who took the exam after the reform are less likely to be married or agreeable, and are 
more likely to have the highest grade in SSC, to study engineering, and to have had a higher 
income in the previous job. In terms of parental education and labor-force participation, there 
is no difference between the post-reform and pre-reform cohorts. As shown in Panel C, there 
are no significant differences in personality traits of pre- and post-reform cohorts both in 
applicant pool and BCS officers.  
                                                  
11 See appendix for how the Big-Five index, PSM, pro-social behavior, and pro-social preference are 
measured. 
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Table 2 presents the PSM (Panel A), pro-social behaviors (Panel B), and social 
preferences (Panel C). Regarding the applicant pool, there is no difference in PSM index 
between pre-and post-reform cohorts. Among civil service officers, however, the post-reform 
cohort has higher PSM than the pre-reform cohort. On average, pro-social behaviors of pre- 
and post-reform cohorts are comparable in both the applicant pool and among BCS officers. 
Panel C suggests mixed results. While applicants in the post-reform cohort tend to have 
worse social preferences than those in the pre-reform cohort, BCS officers in the post-reform 
cohort tend to be more patient and more altruistic to the poor than those in the pre-reform 
cohort, which are desirable characteristics for public servants.  
5. Estimation Models and Results 
The descriptive statistics showed that both in the applicant pool and among BCS officers, 
educational qualification measured by the SSC exam improved on average after the reform. 
In terms of PSM, there is no difference between the pre and post cohorts in the applicant pool, 
while the PSM of BCS officers after the reform is higher than in those before. It was also 
found that BCS officers who took the exam after the reform tend to have better social 
preferences than those before the reform. In this section, regression analyses are conducted to 
test if even after controlling for other characteristics, BCS officers after the reform are more 
motivated than those before the reform.  
5.1 Estimation Model 
The effect of financial incentive on the qualities and motivational profiles of the BCS 
applicant pool is estimated by the following Ordinary Least Square models, similar to those 
of Dal Bo et al. (2013), Deserranno (2019), and Donato et al. (2017): 
 𝑌௜௧ ൌ 𝛼 ൅ 𝛽𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡௧ ൅ 𝜌𝑋௜௧ ൅ 𝑒௜௧   ……………..Eq. 1 
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where 𝑌௜௧  is educational quality (highest grade in the SSC examination or engineering 
graduate), the income at the previous job, personality traits, PSM, pro-social behavior, or 
social preferences. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡௧ takes the value 0 if individual i took the BCS examination before 
the 2015 pay scale reform and 1 otherwise. X is a set of the individual i’s characteristics, 
determined before he or she took the SSC examination, including age, sex, location of 
childhood (whether raised in an urban area), schooling years, and occupation of parents. 
While α, β, and ρ are coefficients to be estimated, e is an error term.  
The effect of the pay-scale reform on the applicant pool is estimated by 𝛽. This is 
because those who took the examination in 2012 and 2013 did not know that the pay scale 
would increase in 2015 and thus could not have intentionally postponed their application until 
2015. Further, the increased pay scale is applied to all officers, not only to those in the 
post-reform cohort. There is no incentive to manipulate the timing of one’s application. Since 
BCS officers were over-sampled, sampling weights are applied in all the analyses to represent 
the applicant pool accurately. The standard errors are clustered at the survey location 
(districts and training centers where interviews were conducted) and by interviewer.  
The effect of the reform on BCS officers’ qualities and motivation profiles is 
estimated by the difference-in-difference (DID) approach:  
 𝑌௜௧ ൌ 𝛼 ൅ 𝛽𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡௧ ൅ 𝑏𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡௧ ൈ 𝑂௜ ൅ 𝑐 𝑂௜ ൅ 𝜌𝑋௜௧ ൅ 𝑒௜௧……….eq. 2  
where 𝑂௜ takes the value 1 if the individual passed the examination (i.e., is a BCS officer) 
and 0 otherwise. While α, β, b, c, and ρ are coefficients to be estimated, e is an error term. If 
officers in the post-reform cohort have lower PSM (motivational profiles) on average, the 
coefficient of the interaction term, b, will be negative. 
For identifying DID estimates, the common trend assumption must hold. Officers are 
of better academic quality than those who did not pass the examination, based on the fact that 
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they passed the examination. The pre-reform trend (2012-2013) in quality should be 
comparable for officers and non-officers, since there is no change in the labor market 
situation, educational policies (ADB & ILO, 2016; Hossain & Mohammad, 2015; Khan et al., 
2014), or recruitment criteria of the civil service officers. It is tested whether the coefficient 
of an interaction term between the 2013 group and those who passed the examination 
(officers) is significantly different from zero by using the sample of those who took the 
examination either in 2012 or 2013. Both for the SSC examination grade and PSM index, the 
coefficients are not significant, suggesting that the common trend assumption is not violated.  
 5.2 Estimation Results on Applicant Pool 
Table 3 shows the estimated coefficients of Post in Equation 1 for all the qualities and 
motivation profiles. In 18 out of 21 models, there is no evidence that the pay-scale reform 
affected the characteristics of the applicant pool. The results show that the higher wage 
attracted people who are more pro-social, less present-biased, and less risk-averse than those 
in the pre-reform cohort. These results are not expected but these characteristics are 
preferable for BCS officers.  
To summarize, there is no evidence that the higher wage attracted applicants with 
higher quality and with lower motivational profiles. Rather, applicants in the post-reform 
cohort tend to be more engaged in volunteer and charity work, less present-biased, and less 
risk averse. More specifically, the effect of the 2015 pay-scale reform on the civil service 
applicant pool is not significant on average. The more important question is whether the 
reform changed the quality of BCS officers or not, which is discussed in the next section. 
5.3 Effect of the reform on BCS officers 
Table 4 shows the estimated results on characteristics of BCS officers. As seen in the positive 
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coefficient of 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡௧ ൈ 𝑂௜, BCS officers recruited after the pay-scale reform have higher SSC 
examination scores and an engineering background. Furthermore, BCS officers in the 
post-reform cohort have higher PSM index, particularly committed to public service, than 
those in the pre-reform cohort. The results on pro-social behavior and social preference show 
that BCS officers who applied for the examination after the reform tend to be more patient 
and altruistic to the poor. Regarding the personality traits, it is found that BCS officers 
recruited after the reform are less extraverted and more conscientious. These traits are well 
suited to being a BCS officer.  
In sum, BCS officers who joined the civil service after the pay scale reform have 
higher educational qualification, higher PSM, and better social preferences (patience and 
altruism) than those who joined before. Although there is no impact on the applicant pool on 
average, the increased number of applications from highly qualified individuals resulted in an 
improvement in the characteristics of BCS officers hired after the reform.  
6. Conclusions 
This study empirically examined whether financial incentives can be used as a policy 
instrument to recruit high-quality civil-service officers with high public-sector motivations by 
using the case of the 2015 pay scale reform in Bangladesh, which doubled the salaries of civil 
servants. Unlike the existing studies, this study examines the effectiveness of financial 
incentives on recruiting elite civil service officers. This is a main contribution of this study to 
the literature. The empirical results are encouraging: post-reform BCS officers have higher 
educational quality than pre-reform officers and higher PSM. Compared to pre-reform BCS 
officers, they are also more motivated to public service, more altruistic to the poor, and have 
higher social preferences. The results for the applicant pool show that applicants in the 
post-reform cohort are more engaged in volunteer and charity activities, less present biased, 
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and less risk averse than applicants in the pre-reform cohort. Although Dal Bo et al. (2013) 
found that financial incentive improved the educational qualification of the applicant pool by 
examining frontline public sector workers, there is no evidence that financial incentive can 
improve educational quality of applicant pool for elite civil service jobs examined in this 
study.  
Since the performance of the work done by BCS officers is difficult to measure, this 
study did not examine the effect of the reform on the performance of the civil service per se. 
There is no guarantee that better quality individuals at the recruitment stage continuously 
perform in the long run, as Bertrand et al. (2018) find in the context of the Indian elite civil 
service, where those with lower promotion prospects are less motivated and inefficient in 
providing public service. As the promotion prospect in BCS is highly politicized and 84% of 
our sampled BCS officers expressed concerns about promotion, the government may need to 
introduce promotion criteria not based on lobbying and political choices. This can motivate 
officers to provide public service until retirement. This can also have a positive effect on 
recruiting better-quality individuals for the civil service, as also found in Morgan et al. 
(2012).Whether the performance of BCS has improved due to the reform and whether the 
effects of the reform on the applicant pool in other sectors (local government) and cadre 
services (such as Tax, Customs, and Foreign Affairs) are similar to those found in this study 
(on BCS administrative cadre) remains a topic for future research.  
There can be a negative consequence of the pay scale reform. As was found in the 
estimation results, a larger portion of highly qualified professional graduates (engineers) are 
hired as a BCS general cadres jobs (administration) after the reform. As Islam (2016) rightly 
pointed out, it is good to build a strong and capable public sector human capital when a 
country is in the developing stage through incentives, but in the long run, this may hamper 
private sector development. Policy makers must consider this possibility in advance, so that 
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the public sector wage is not too high compared with private sector jobs.  
Finally, as the civil service examination is conducted by the Bangladesh Public 
Service Commission, the list of applicants is confidential. Therefore, the list of applicants 
collected from the coaching centers may not perfectly representative to the actual applicant 
pool. It is important to keep this in mind as a caveat of this study.  
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Table 1. Socio-demographic condition, educational background, and personality traits of the 
applicants and incumbent civil service officers who took BCS exam before and after the 2015 
Pay Scale Reform 
Variables 
Applicants 
who took 
BCS exam 
before the 
reform 
Applicants 
took BCS 
exam after 
the reform 
p-valu
e 
Incumbent 
BCS 
officers who 
took BCS 
exam before 
the reform 
Incumbent 
BCS 
officers who 
took the 
BCS exam 
after the 
reform 
p-value
Panel A: Mean Characteristics (Socio-demographic condition) 
Number of obs. 279 154  188 115  
Married 0.60 0.28 0.00 0.79 0.46 0.00 
 (0.49) (0.45)  (0.41) (0.50)  
Male 0.80 0.73 0.11 0.69 0.68 0.84 
 (0.40) (0.44)  (0.46) (0.47)  
Raised in urban area 0.58 0.64 0.23 0.74 0.70 0.48 
 (0.49) (0.48)  (0.44) (0.46)  
Schooling years of  12.25 12.38 0.72 13.3 13.4 0.82 
  father (4.08) (3.34)  (3.96) (3.39)  
Father does business 0.21 0.37 0.00 0.17 0.24 0.13 
 (0.41) (0.48)  (0.38) (0.43)  
Father is 1st/2nd class 
government officer 
0.19 0.26 0.10 0.27 0.34 0.13 
(0.39) (0.44)  (0.44) (0.48)  
Schooling years of  9.52 9.62 0.71 10.37 10.93 0.18 
  mother (3.39) (2.26)  (3.49) (3.46)  
Mother has job 0.11 0.07 0.17 0.16 0.21 0.32 
 (0.31) (0.25)  (0.37) (0.41)  
Previous Log Real  10.25 10.24 0.87 10.21 10.45 0.00 
  Income (0.39) (0.45)  (0.43) (0.43)  
Enroll in coaching  0.63 0.68 0.36 0.40 0.38 0.78 
  center (0.63) (0.68)  (0.49) (0.49)  
Quota privilege 0.22 0.11 0.00 0.46 .50 0.58 
 (0.42) (0.32)  (0.50) (0.50)  
Did private sector job 0.33 0.18 0.00 0.34 0.27 0.17 
 (0.47) (0.38)  (0.48) (0.45)  
Panel B: Mean Characteristics (Educational Background) 
Highest Grade in SSC  0.19 0.32 0.00 0.24 0.51 0.00 
  exam (0.47) (0.39)  (0.43) (0.50)  
Schooling Years 16.90 16.92 0.38 16.87 16.84 0.52 
 (0.30) (0.31)  (0.33) (0.49)  
Schooling in urban area 0.33 0.43 0.05 0.50 0.50 0.88 
 (0.47) (0.50)  (0.50) (0.50)  
Engineering graduate  0.07 0.08 0.73 0.10 0.28 0.00 
 (0.26) (0.28)  (0.30) (0.45)  
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Table 1. Socio-demographic condition, educational background, and Personality traits of the 
applicants and incumbent civil service officers took BCS exam before and after the 2015 Pay 
Scale Reform, cont. 
Variables 
Applicants 
who took 
BCS exam 
before the 
reform 
Applicants 
took BCS 
exam after 
the reform 
p-valu
e 
Incumbent 
BCS 
officers took 
BCS exam 
before the 
reform 
Incumbent 
BCS 
officers took 
BCS exam 
after the 
reform 
p-value
Panel C: Mean Characteristics (Personality traits)  
Big 5 Index 0.06 -0.00 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.43 
 (0.37) (0.37)  (0.43) (0.45)  
Extraversion 3.80 3.84 0.54 3.79 3.64 0.07 
 (0.65) (0.56)  (0.74) (0.67)  
Agreeableness 4.03 3.99 0.37 4.08 3.93 0.02 
 (0.46) (0.54)  (0.46) (0.56)  
Conscientiousness 3.63 3.54 0.13 3.59 3.65 0.42 
 (0.55) (0.65)  (0.62) (0.68)  
Neuroticism 2.67 2.69 0.87 2.67 2.67 0.99 
 (0.67) (0.66)  (0.77) (0.74)  
Openness 3.19 3.26 0.14 3.22 3.16 0.32 
 (0.47) (0.49)  (0.55) (0.56)  
Note: Numbers in brackets are standard deviations. Sampling weight is used during calculation. 
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Table 2. Public Service Motivation Score, Pro-Social behavior and Social Preferences of the 
applicants and incumbent civil service officers who took BCS exam before and after the 2015 
Pay Scale Reform 
Variables Applicants 
took BCS 
exam before 
the 2015 pay 
scale reform  
Applicants 
took BCS 
exam after 
the 2015 
pay scale 
reform 
p- 
value 
Incumbent 
BCS officers 
took BCS 
exam before 
the 2015 pay 
scale  
reform 
Incumbent 
BCS officers 
took BCS 
exam after 
the 2015 pay 
scale  
reform 
p- 
value 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Public Service Motivation 
Number of obs 279 154  188 115  
PSM Index -0.17 -0.23 0.14 -0.21 -0.04 0.02
 (0.45) (0.41)  (0.51) (0.52)  
Attraction to Policy  3.90 3.7 0.01 3.93 4.01 0.23
  Making (0.50) (0.63)  (0.52) (0.57)  
Commitment to the  3.79 3.86 0.13 3.74 4.03 0.00
  Public Interest (0.52) (0.45)  (0.54) (0.56)  
Social Justice 3.02 2.99 0.47 3.02 3.00 0.65
 (0.35) (0.35)  (0.42) (0.52)  
Civic Duty 3.96 3.95 0.74 3.91 3.98 0.26
 (0.45) (0.37)  (0.54) (0.53)  
Compassion 3.06 2.96 0.02 3.02 3.04 0.77
 (0.46) (0.40)  (0.56) (0.57)  
Self-Sacrifice 4.00 4.04 0.80 4.02 4.11 0.14
 (0.42) (0.31)  (0.46) (0.59)  
Making Panel B: Pro-social characteristics  
Participated in  0.65 0.70 0.27 0.63 0.66 0.59
volunteer activities (0.48) (0.46)  (0.48) (0.47)  
Panel C: Social Preferences  
Least patient 0.75 0.82 0.09 0.72 0.54 0.03
 (0.43) (0.39)  (0.45) (0.50)  
Present bias  0.06 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.09 0.89
 (0.24) (0.14)  (0.28) (0.28)  
Risk averse (Most) 0.70 0.57 0.01 0.70 0.60 0.11
 (0.46) (0.50)  (0.46) (0.49)  
Altruism to the poor  5.88 5.42 0.09 6.15 7.26 0.00
  family (2.82) (2.63)  (3.24) (2.83)  
Note: Numbers in brackets are standard deviations. Sampling weight is used during calculation. 
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Table 3. Effect of the 2015 Pay Scale Reform on Applicant Pool 
Outcome variables Coeff. of Post 
(standard error) 
# obs 
R2 
=1 if grade of SSC exam is A+ 0.06 433 
 (0.07) 0.09 
Engineering graduate 0.03 433 
 (0.02) 0.12 
log real income in previous job -1.03 433 
 (1.01) 0.12 
Big 5 index -0.04 433 
 (0.05) 0.03 
Extraversion 0.07 433 
 (0.07) 0.04 
Agreeableness -0.01 433 
 (0.15) 0.06 
Conscientiousness -0.03 433 
 (0.10) 0.05 
Neuroticism -0.05 433 
 (0.14) 0.09 
Openness 0.03 433 
 (0.11) 0.07 
PSM index -0.01 433 
 (0.08) 0.09 
Interested in Policy making -0.09 433 
 (0.13) 0.13 
Commitment to pub service 0.09 433 
 (0.10) 0.07 
Social Justice 0.02 433 
 (0.07) 0.04 
Civic duty -0.04 433 
 (0.09) 0.04 
Compassion -0.03 433 
 (0.06) 0.05 
Self-sacrifice -0.01 433 
 (0.05) 0.07 
=1 if Participated voluntary/charity activities 0.15*** 433 
 (0.05) 0.13 
=1 if Least Patient -0.02 433 
 (0.06) 0.12 
=1 if Present Bias -0.07** 433 
 (0.03) 0.08 
=1 if Most risk- averse -0.23** 433 
 (0.11) 0.09 
Altruism to poor (0-10) -0.54 433 
 (0.49) 0.05 
Notes: We clustered the standard error at the survey locations (districts and training center where 
interviewed were undertaken) and enumerators are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. Other controls are: age, male, urban, schooling years and occupation of father and mother. 
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Table 4. Effect of the 2015 Pay Scale Reform on BCS Officers 
Outcome variables Coeff. of Post x O 
(s.e) 
Coeff. of 
Post (s.e) 
Coeff. of O 
(s.e.) 
# obs
R2 
     
=1 if grade of SSC exam is A+ 0.17* 0.02 0.07 433 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.05) 0.10 
Engineering graduate 0.21*** -0.02 0.02 433 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) 0.13 
log real income in previous job -0.11 -0.74 2.41** 433 
 (1.12) (1.27) (0.91) 0.09 
Big 5 index -0.02 -0.02 0.09 433 
 (0.07) (0.04) (0.08) 0.03 
Extraversion -0.30*** 0.13 0.06 433 
 (0.11) (0.08) (0.11) 0.04 
Agreeableness -0.19 0.05 0.05 433 
 (0.14) (0.16) (0.09) 0.04 
Conscientiousness 0.20* -0.10 -0.09 433 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.09) 0.04 
Neuroticism 0.02 0.02 -0.01 433 
 (0.20) (0.18) (0.14) 0.04 
Openness -0.21 0.10 0.11 433 
 (0.16) (0.14) (0.07) 0.04 
PSM index 0.25** -0.10 0.01 433 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) 0.08 
Interested in Policy making 0.23 -0.19 0.19* 433 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.11) 0.15 
Commitment to public service 0.29** 0.02 -0.02 433 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) 0.07 
Social Justice -0.05 0.01 0.03 433 
 (0.10) (0.08) (0.05) 0.03 
Civic duty 0.12 -0.06 -0.11** 433 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.05) 0.03 
Compassion 0.15 -0.07 -0.06 433 
 (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) 0.05 
Self-sacrifice 0.12 -0.06 -0.00 433 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) 0.04 
=1 if Participated voluntary/charity activities -0.07 0.15** 0.00 433 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.09 0.12 
=1 if Least Patient -0.28*** 0.09** 0.01 433 
 (0.09 (0.04) (0.07) 0.11 
=1 if Present Bias 0.04 -0.08* 0.05 433 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) 0.08 
=1 if Most risk- averse 0.05 -0.21* 0.07 433 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) 0.08 
Altruism to poor (0-10) 1.98** -1.01* 0.52 433 
 (0.67) (0.53) (0.70) 0.07 
Notes: We clustered the standard error at the survey locations (districts and training center where 
interviewed were undertaken) and enumerators are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. Other controls are: age, male, urban, schooling years and occupation of father and mother. 
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Appendix: Variables 
 Age: Calculated from self-reported birthdate  
 Male (male=1, 0 otherwise),  
 Married (married=1, 0 otherwise)  
 Raised in an urban area: equals 1 if the applicant raised in the district and capital area 
up to secondary education. 
 Years of schooling: Measured by years. In the context of Bangladesh education 
system, completed primary school=5 years, completed secondary school=10 years, 
College graduate=12 years, university graduate=16 years, and post graduate=17 years. 
 Father’s education: Schooling years of father  
 Mother’s education: Schooling years of mother 
 Father’s occupation (business): equals 1 if the father of the respondent is in business. 
 Father’s occupation (government): equals 1 if the father is a first/second class 
government officer 
 Mother has job: equals 1 if mother work outside the home for a wage.  
 Highest grade in the Secondary School Certificate (SSC) examination: equals 1 if the 
individual got grade A+ (90-100% marks) in the secondary school certificate 
examination.  
 Enrolled in coaching center: equals 1 if the applicants/officers took BCS examination 
preparation in the coaching center.   
 Engineering major: equals 1 if the individual graduated from the engineering faculty 
of a technical university.  
 Quota Privilege: This variable takes 1 if the applicants have quota privilege for 
getting BCS job and zero otherwise. 
 Took BCS exam in 2013: It equals 1 if one applied for BCS exam in 2013 and zero 
otherwise. 
 Experience in Private sector jobs: It equals 1 if the applicants/officers worked for 
private sector jobs before applying to the civil service examination and zero 
otherwise. 
 The Big-Five factor model developed by John (1990) contains 44 items, which are in 
turn divided into five dimensions of personality: extraversion; agreeableness; 
consciousness; neuroticism, and openness (Almlund et al., 2011). The responses were 
collected on 5-point Likert scales, showing the extent to which the applicants and 
officers agreed or disagreed with the statements. In this study, we use a shorter list of 
questions containing 10 questions, with 2 questions per dimension, following Donato 
et al. (2017) and Rammstedt & John (2007).  
 Extraversion: Extravert represents the traits of an individual related to activity and 
energy, mainly sociable (Benet-Martínez & John, 1998). Computed as the average 
response to the two questions related to extraversion.  
I like to interact and talk with people. 
I am sometime shy and unable to communicate with other easily. (reversed) 
Cronbach’s alpha for these two questions: 0.4 
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 Agreeableness: Agreeableness represents the traits of an individual related to altruism, 
tender mindedness, trust and modesty (Benet-Martínez & John, 1998). Computed as 
the average response to the two questions related to Agreeableness.  
I like to cooperate with others although it is difficult. 
I tend to find fault with others (reversed). 
Cronbach’s alpha for these two questions: 0.12 
 Conscientiousness: Conscientiousness represents the traits of an individual related to 
hardworking, organized , responsible and goal directed behavior (Benet-Martínez & 
John, 1998). Computed as the average response to the two questions related to 
extraversion. 
I do any task with regard to every detail: not superficial and partial. 
Anybody can depend on me (in general).  
Cronbach’s alpha for these two questions: 0.4 
 Neuroticism: Neuroticism represents the traits of the individual related to anxiety, 
sadness, irritability, nervousness, emotional instability. Computed as the average 
response to the two questions related to Neuroticism.  
I can be tensed a lot in any matter. 
I am emotionally stable, not easily upset (reversed). 
Cronbach’s alpha for these two questions: 0.3 
 Openness: Individual having openness behavior shows openness to new aesthetic, 
cultural and intellectual experiences (Dal Bo et al., 2013). Computed as the average 
response to the two questions related to Openness.  
I like to think deeply or carefully about any task. 
I Prefer work that is routine (reversed). 
Cronbach’s alpha for these two questions: 0.4 
 Big-Five Personality Index: It is an equally weighted average of the z-score of each 
module of the Big-Five Personality inventory. In the case of Neuroticism module, we 
consider the reverse score as it is a negative trait.  
 PSM index: To construct PSM index we elicit 12 statements from the 40 statements 
from Perry’s 1996 scale of Public service motivation (Perry, 1996), and created an 
equally weighted average of the z-scores of each module of the PSM.  
 Attraction to Policy Making: Computed as the average response to the following two 
questions. 
I am interested in making public programs and policies which are beneficial for the 
country. 
I like to share my views on public policies with others. 
 Participated in volunteering or charity activities: equal 1 if the individual did 
voluntary works or charity activities before applying in the civil service, 0 otherwise. 
 Commitment to the Public Interest: Computed as the average response to the 
following two questions. 
An official's obligation to the public should always come before loyalty to superiors. 
I would prefer seeing public officials do what is best for the whole community even if 
it harmed my interests. 
 Social Justice: Computed as the average response to the following two questions.  
30 
 
 
I am not afraid to go to bat for the rights of others even if it means I will be ridiculed. 
I do not believe that government can do much to make society fairer (reversed). 
 Civic Duty: Computed as the average response to the following two questions. 
I believe everyone has a moral commitment to civic affairs no matter how busy they 
are. 
I have an obligation to look after those less well off. 
 Compassion: Computed as the average response to the following two questions. 
I have little compassion for people in need who are unwilling to take the first step to 
help themselves (reversed). 
It is difficult for me to contain my feelings when I see people in distress. 
 Self-Sacrifice: Computed as the average response to the following two questions.  
I believe in putting duty before self. 
Making a difference in society means more to me than personal achievements. 
 Patience and Present Bias: To measure the patience and present bias, we asked 
hypothetically 4 questions. Q1: If he buys a shirt and wins a prize, he can receive the 
prize money 2000 BDT instantly or 2500 BDT after one month. Would he like to wait 
for one month? Yes/No.  Q2: If Q1=No, The respondent is asked if he is offered 
3000 BDT after one month, would he like to wait for one month? Yes/No. Q3: If he 
buys a shirt and wins a prize, he can receive the prize money 2000 after one month or 
2500 after two months. Would he like to wait for two months? Yes/No.  Q4: If 
Q3=No, The respondent is asked if he is offered 3000 BDT after two months, would 
he like to wait for two month? Yes/No.  By using the response to Q2, if one did not 
agree to wait for two months, we consider them “least patient”. If one answered Yes 
in Q1 and No in Q3, or Yes in Q2 and No in Q4, they were identified as “present 
bias”. 
 Most-risk averse: To measure the risk taking behavior, the respondents were asked 3 
lottery questions to choose (A) or (B): (1) (A) 2000 BDT with certainty or (B) 50% 
chance of winning 4000 and 50% chance of zero,  (2) (A) 2000 BDT with certainty 
or (B) 50% chance of winning 8000 and 50% chance of zero, (3) (A) 2000 BDT with 
certainty or (B) 50% chance of winning 10000 and 50% chance of zero. Those who 
did not want to take the risk in lottery 3 are identified as the most risk-averse.  
 Altruism: In this article, we define altruism as the level of the unselfishness of the 
respondents to a poor family. To do so, the respondent is asked a hypothetical 
question: if the respondent is given 10 tokens (1 token values 100 BDT), how many 
tokens does he want to give to poor families and how many tokens does he want to 
keep for himself. Those who agreed to give more tokens to poor families are 
considered as more altruistic. 
 Price Index (CPI) of Bangladesh: CPI data were collected from World Bank (2017). 
We converted the previous wages of the last job to real value at the price level of 
2017. BCS officers who applied for the exam in 2012, 2013, and 2014 were appointed 
to the first post 2.5 years later. So the income of previous job before joining to BCS 
was measured at price level of 2014, 2015, and 2017, respectively. CPI in 2014, 2015, 
and 2017 is 136.05, 152.32, and 161.14, respectively. 
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Appendix: Full Estimation Results 
Appendix Table 1. Effect of the 2015 pay scale reform on the educational qualifications, market skill, & personality of applicant pool 
 =1 if grade 
of SSC exam 
is A+ 
Engineering 
graduate 
log real 
income in 
previous job
Big 5 
index 
Extraversion  Agreeableness Conscientiousness Neuroticism Openness 
Post 0.06 0.03 -1.03 -0.04 0.03 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.03 
 (0.07) (0.03) (1.01) (0.04) (0.07) (0.13) (0.09) (0.14) (0.11) 
age -0.02 0.01 0.49*** 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.18) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
male -0.06 0.08** 1.27** 0.07 0.12 -0.05 -0.00 -0.12 0.05 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.57) (0.05) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Raised in urban 0.13** 0.10*** 0.90* -0.03 -0.13* -0.02 0.06 -0.10 -0.05 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.53) (0.04) (0.07) (0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) 
Father’s education -0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.10) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Mother’s education 0.01 0.01 0.16 0.01 0.01 0.02* -0.02 0.02 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.12) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Father’s occupation  0.08 0.05 -0.11 -0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.08 -0.16 -0.03 
(government) (0.08) (0.04) (1.03) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.14) (0.08) 
Father’s occupation  0.06 0.02 0.29 -0.07 0.07 -0.03 -0.08 -0.11 0.10** 
(business) (0.08) (0.03) (0.85) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.07) (0.12) (0.05) 
Mother has job 0.19** -0.01 -0.24 0.04 0.08 0.19 0.21 -0.39*** 0.06 
 (0.09) (0.06) (0.66) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) 
Constant 0.67* -0.46** -12.66** -0.04 3.92*** 3.68*** 3.53*** 2.53*** 3.42*** 
 (0.36) (0.20) (5.35) (0.32) (0.52) (0.51) (0.41) (0.64) (0.43) 
Observations 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 
R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 
Notes: We clustered the standard error at the survey locations (districts and training center where interviewed were undertaken) and enumerators are reported 
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 
  
33 
 
 
Appendix Table 2. Effect of the 2015 pay scale reform on the PSM, pro-social behavior, & social preferences of applicant pool 
 PSM 
index 
Interested 
in Policy 
making 
Commitment 
to pub 
service 
Social 
Justice
Civic 
duty 
Compassion Self- 
sacrifice
=1 if 
Participated 
voluntary 
and  
charity 
activities 
=1 if 
Least 
Patient
=1 if 
Present 
Bias 
=1 if 
Most 
risk- 
averse 
Altruism 
to poor 
(0-10) 
Post -0.03 -0.14 0.10 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.13** 0.01 -0.07** -0.20* -0.50 
 (0.08) (0.13) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.10) (0.53) 
age 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.02* -0.01 0.02** -0.02 -0.01* -0.03** 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) 
male 0.17*** 0.35*** 0.08 0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.05 0.35*** -0.09 -0.04 -0.04 0.02 
 (0.05) (0.12) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.07) (0.44) 
Raised in urban -0.11*** 0.04 -0.15*** -0.07* 0.00 -0.07 -0.11** -0.01 -0.08* 0.01 -0.09 0.72** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.02) (0.08) (0.33) 
Father’s education -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01** -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01** 0.01 -0.03 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.05) 
Mother’s education 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) 
Father’s occupation 0.12* -0.00 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.01 0.07 -0.06 -0.12 -0.05 -0.14** 0.37 
(government) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.40) 
Father’s occupation 0.05 -0.12 0.17*** -0.02 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.08 -0.00 -0.03 -0.15*** 0.06 
(business) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.44) 
Mother has job 0.04 -0.04 -0.14* 0.10* 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.17* -0.16 0.07 -0.17 0.11 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.12) (0.05) (0.16) (0.58) 
Constant -0.35 3.96*** 3.25*** 3.04*** 3.88*** 2.54*** 4.31*** -0.29 1.52*** 0.33** 1.68*** 5.85*** 
 (0.30) (0.52) (0.45) (0.33) (0.31) (0.42) (0.28) (0.30) (0.35) (0.17) (0.41) (2.19) 
Observations 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 
R-squared 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.02 
Notes: We clustered the standard error at the survey locations (districts and training center where interviewed were undertaken) and enumerators are reported 
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
  
34 
 
 
Appendix Table 3. Effect of the 2015 pay scale reform on the educational qualifications, market skill, & personality of BCS officers 
 =1 if grade 
of SSC exam 
is A+ 
Engineering 
graduate 
log real 
income in 
previous job
Big 5 
index 
Extraversion Agreeableness Conscientiousness Neuroticism Openness 
Post x O 0.17* 0.21*** -0.11 -0.02 -0.30*** -0.19 0.20* 0.02 -0.21 
 (0.09) (0.06) (1.12) (0.07) (0.11) (0.14) (0.12) (0.20) (0.16) 
Post 0.02 -0.02 -0.74 -0.02 0.13 0.05 -0.10 0.02 0.10 
 (0.08) (0.03) (1.27) (0.04) (0.08) (0.16) (0.11) (0.18) (0.14) 
O 0.07 0.02 2.41*** 0.09 0.06 0.05 -0.09 -0.01 0.11 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.91) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.07) 
age -0.02 0.01 0.37** -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.15) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
male -0.04 0.09*** 1.64*** 0.08** 0.13* -0.04 -0.01 -0.12 0.07 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.54) (0.04) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Raised in urban 0.12** 0.09*** 0.50 -0.04 -0.14* -0.03 0.07 -0.10 -0.07 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.59) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) 
Father’s education -0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.10) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Mother’s education 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.02* -0.02 0.02 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Father’s occupation  0.07 0.04 -0.17 -0.04 0.05 -0.00 0.08 -0.16 -0.03 
(government) (0.07) (0.04) (0.86) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.14) (0.08) 
Father’s occupation  0.06 0.02 0.40 -0.06 0.06 -0.04 -0.07 -0.11 0.10** 
(business) (0.08) (0.02) (0.85) (0.05) (0.12) (0.06) (0.07) (0.12) (0.05) 
Mother has job 0.15* -0.04 -0.86 0.02 0.10 0.20* 0.21* -0.39*** 0.06 
 (0.09) (0.06) (0.70) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Constant 0.83** -0.34 -10.00** 0.05 3.84*** 3.65*** 3.53*** 2.53*** 3.44*** 
 (0.40) (0.22) (4.72) (0.33) (0.53) (0.55) (0.37) (0.61) (0.40) 
Observations 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 
R-squared 0.10 0.13 0.16 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Notes: We clustered the standard error at the survey locations (districts and training center where interviewed were undertaken) and enumerators are reported 
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Appendix Table 4. Effect of the 2015 pay scale reform on the PSM, pro-social behavior, & social preferences of BCS officers 
 PSM 
index 
Interested 
in Policy 
making 
Commitment 
to pub service
Social 
Justice 
Civic 
duty 
Compassion Self- 
sacrifice
=1 if 
Participated 
voluntary 
and  
charity 
activities 
=1 if 
Least 
Patient
=1 if 
Present 
Bias 
=1 if 
Most 
risk- 
averse 
Altruism 
to poor 
(0-10) 
Post x O 0.26** 0.23 0.29*** -0.05 0.12 0.15 0.12 -0.07 -0.28*** 0.04 0.05 1.98*** 
 (0.10) (0.16) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.05) (0.11) (0.67) 
Post -0.10 -0.19 0.02 0.01 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 0.15** 0.09** -0.08** -0.21* -1.01* 
 (0.09) (0.16) (0.12) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.11) (0.53) 
O 0.01 0.19* -0.02 0.03 -0.11** -0.06 -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.52 
 (0.07) (0.11) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.70) 
age -0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.02* -0.01 0.02** -0.01 -0.01** -0.03** -0.05 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) 
male 0.17*** 0.38*** 0.08 0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.05 0.35*** -0.09 -0.03 -0.03 0.13 
 (0.05) (0.11) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.35) 
Raised in urban -0.12** 0.00 -0.14*** -0.07** 0.02 -0.06 -0.11** -0.01 -0.08* 0.00 -0.10 0.63** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.02) (0.07) (0.32) 
Father’s education -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01** -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01*** 0.01 -0.03 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.05) 
Mother’s education 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01* 0.00 -0.04 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) 
Father’s occupation 0.11 -0.02 0.08 0.07 0.11* 0.01 0.07 -0.06 -0.11 -0.05* -0.14** 0.31 
(government) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.42) 
Father’s occupation 0.06 -0.11 0.18*** -0.02 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.08 -0.01 -0.02 -0.15** 0.14 
(business) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.45) 
Mother has job 0.01 -0.11 -0.16* 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.10 0.18* -0.14 0.05 -0.19 -0.22 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.12) (0.04) (0.14) (0.58) 
Constant -0.22 4.29*** 3.36*** 3.05*** 3.81*** 2.55*** 4.36*** -0.32 1.40*** 0.41** 1.78*** 7.39*** 
 (0.29) (0.51) (0.45) (0.35) (0.33) (0.43) (0.29) (0.29) (0.38) (0.16) (0.45) (2.50) 
Observations 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 
R-squared 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.07 
Notes: We clustered the standard error at the survey locations (districts and training center where interviewed were undertaken) and enumerators are reported in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
